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Abstract: In preparing this paper, we have returned to first principles and re-evaluated 
fundamental aspects of libel law, its purposes, its substance, and its processes. Our thinking 
has been informed by, first, philosophical understandings of democracy and the public sphere 
and in particular the role of freedom of speech and of the media therein, and secondly, the 
social psychology of reputation and privacy. By doing this, we are able to ground some of the 
proposals for reform made previously by Index on Censorship, English PEN, Lord Lester, and 
others. We do so, however, not through the prism of an over-weaned emphasis on freedom of 
expression, but rather by triangulating the rights and interests of claimants, defendants, and the 
wider public. Ultimately, we recommend a coherent set of significant substantive and 
procedural reforms that if enacted would enhance access to justice and reduce costs for all but 
the most serious and/or most damaging libels. This involves the recommendation of the 
introduction of a two-track libel regime. 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Libel reform is happening. Earlier this year, Lord Lester sponsored a path-finding 
– if ultimately abortive – reform Bill in the House of Lords. The Government has 
recently confirmed that it has started work on a draft Defamation Bill, and that 
this will be complete by March 2011. A period of consultation is planned after 
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publication of the draft Bill, and it is currently proposed that a Defamation Bill 
will be introduced in the second session of this Parliament.1 No one contests that 
there are problems with the existing law and practice of libel. If the Government 
does not renege on a good number of the proposals set out in the Lester Bill, 
however, it will have missed an historic opportunity to reframe the law so as 
properly to value and balance personal and social interests in expression, 
reputation, and access to justice. Our basic complaint regarding both the Index on 
Censorship / English PEN report,2 and the Lester Bill has been that they over-
emphasise freedom of expression to the virtual exclusion of other important 
values.3 In consequence, they focus in large measure upon revising the substantive 
law of libel. Our view has been that the primary problems in this area concern 
procedures and costs. We think that there is a real risk that because the Lester Bill 
has now taken the floor, it will continue to distract attention from the key 
problems. 
In preparing this paper, we have returned to first principles and re-evaluated 
fundamental aspects of libel law, its purposes, its substance, and its processes. Our 
thinking has been informed by, first, philosophical understandings of democracy 
and the public sphere and in particular the role of freedom of speech and of the 
media therein, and secondly, the social psychology of reputation. By doing this, we 
are able to ground some of the proposals for reform made previously by Index on 
Censorship, English PEN, Lord Lester, and others. We do so, however, not 
through the prism of an over-weaned emphasis on freedom of expression, but 
rather by triangulating the rights and interests of claimants, defendants, and the 
wider public. Ultimately, we recommend a coherent set of significant substantive 
and procedural reforms that if enacted would enhance access to justice and reduce 
costs for the vast majority of libel actions. In essence this involves the 
recommendation of a two-track libel regime. The first track would involve the 
establishment of a new approach to libel actions and might be administered by the 
High Court, but alternatively could be overseen by a libel tribunal, a (self-) 
regulator, or perhaps the County Court. The vast majority of cases would be 
disposed of by this route. The second track would involve only the most serious 
and / or most damaging libels. These would continue to be heard in the High 
Court. 
In the paragraphs that follow, first, we review and develop the principles that 
should underpin the libel regime. Secondly, we consider the purposes of libel law 
and reflect on how the revised understanding of the foundational principles 
should influence regime design. We conclude by sketching the outlines of a two-
                                                     
1 Ministry of Justice, Business Plan 2011-2015, 19. 
2 Index on Censorship / English PEN, Free Speech is Not For Sale (2009), at 
http://www.libelreform.org/our-report (last visited November 2010) [the Index / PEN report]. 
3 A. Mullis and A. Scott, ‘Something Rotten in the State of English Libel Law? A Rejoinder to the 
Clamour for Reform of Defamation’ (2009) 14(6) Communications Law 173; ‘Lord Lester’s Defamation Bill: 
A Distorted View of the Public Interest?’ (2010) (7 July) Inforrm. 
  
Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott                                         Reframing Libel 
  
 
 3 
track libel regime that is consonant with the underlying principles on which any 
such regime must be based. 
 
 
 
PRINCIPLES UNDERPINNING THE LIBEL REGIME 
 
The normative foundations of any coherent libel regime must comprise an 
appropriate valuation of the individual and social importance of freedom of 
expression, reputation, and access to justice. These principles will sometimes be in 
tension. As reflected in our previous contributions to the reform debate, our 
concern has been that the first of these ideas has come to predominate, and that to 
the extent that the third principle is discussed this is almost always done to 
highlight the undoubted ‘chilling effect’ of the existing costs regime on freedom of 
speech. 
 
TAKING FREE SPEECH SERIOUSLY 
 
The central importance in a democracy of freedom of expression is universally 
recognised. It is regularly reiterated by European and domestic courts.4 It is a 
mainstay of liberal political theory. Our thinking has been informed by Habermas’ 
theories of communicative action, discourse ethics, and the public sphere, which 
comprise a seminal contribution to the literature on ‘deliberative’ or ‘discursive 
democracy’.5 The starting point is Habermas’ identification of a series of 
normative standards for human conduct that are implied in every communicative 
act (the ‘inescapable presuppositions of speech’). This understanding is then 
correlated with the depiction of society as composed of ‘system’ and ‘lifeworld’ to 
offer a two-tiered model of the democratic constitution. The first tier comprises 
the ‘public sphere’, wherein proceeds the open discussion between disparate 
citizens, interest groups, organisations, and expert commentators of all issues of 
mutual concern. Obviously, the mass media offers a significant platform for public 
                                                     
4 In Steel and Morris v United Kingdom (2005) 41 EHRR 22, for example, the European Court of Human 
Rights noted that ‘[freedom of speech is] one of the essential foundations of a democratic society and one 
of the basic conditions for its progress and for each individual’s self-fulfilment [...] applicable not only to 
“information” or “ideas” that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of 
indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance 
and broadmindedness without which there is no “democratic society”’ at [87]. Similarly, in R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex parte Simms [2000] 1 AC 115, Lord Steyn explained that ‘freedom of 
expression is, of course, intrinsically important: it is valued for its own sake. But it is well recognised that 
it is also instrumentally important. It serves a number of broad objectives. First, it promotes the self-
fulfilment of individuals in society. Secondly, in the famous words of Holmes J [...] “the best test of truth 
is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” [...] thirdly, freedom 
of speech is the lifeblood of democracy. The free flow of information and ideas informs political debate. 
It is a safety valve: people are more ready to accept decisions that go against them if they can in principle 
seek to influence them. It acts as a brake on the abuse of power’ at [126]. 
5 ibid. 
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sphere representations and – to some extent – discussion. In addition, however, ‘a 
portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation in which 
private individuals assemble to form a public body’.6 That is, on every occasion on 
which people discuss matters of mutual, public concern. On the second level are 
the legally constituted institutions of government, responsible for the formal 
transposition of the collective political will into positive law. The role of 
constitutional critique and scholarship is twofold: to consider the extent to which 
the constitution allows powerful interlocutors to subvert the integrity of the public 
sphere, and to assess the coherence of the articulation between the two tiers in 
terms of both processes and outcomes. 
Manifestly, libel law is one aspect of the constitution of the public sphere, and 
is therefore – notwithstanding its primary focus on the determination of individual 
interests – an important subject for constitutional critique. There are few people 
who do not recognise the strictures that the current libel regime can impose on 
free speech. There is clearly potential for misuse of libel law to preclude 
investigative journalism, to stifle scientific and medical debate, to undermine the 
important work of human rights organisations and other NGOs, and to invite the 
strategic legal tourist from abroad. To the extent that the law allows powerful 
individuals or corporate entities to ‘chill’ important, warranted comment 
concerning themselves, their activities, their products or their ideas, it is socially 
dysfunctional. Where we have differed from others in recognising this potentiality 
is in identifying costs, processes, and remedies rather than the substantive law as 
the key issues to be addressed. 
One of the important features of Habermas’ work is the contention that 
rights are considered to be ‘relational’ in origin. They are derived from the fact of 
society and are not primarily inherent in individuals. Their importance and value 
are not just personal or individual; they are also social in character. This is clear as 
regards freedom of speech in the emphasis placed on the interests of the wider 
public in the rendition of the standard arguments from democracy and from 
truth.7 It also applies to the rights to privacy and to reputation. Moreover, the 
potential for divergence between the interests of the media and those of the 
audiences for its output must not be overlooked.8 
This suggests a further respect in which the current law of libel does not 
adequately secure the provision of full and accurate information on matters of 
public importance. This is its failure sometimes to ensure the correction of error, 
                                                     
6 J. Habermas, ‘The Public Sphere: An Encyclopedia Article (1964)’ (1974) 1(3) New German Critique 49, 
49. 
7 See generally, E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2005), ch 1. These 
ideas are encapsulated in the comments of Lord Steyn in ex parte Simms (see n 4 above). 
8 This was reflected in the recent comments of J. Tugendhat in JIH v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2010] 
EWHC 2818 (QB) to the effect that ‘it is not to be assumed that news publishers are always concerned to 
protect the Art 10 rights of the public’ at [61]. In contrast, it was elided by Lord Lester when acting as 
Chair at the ‘Reframing Libel’ symposium (City University London, 4 November 2010), who explicitly 
assimilated the media and the public, suggesting that their respective interests were entirely mutually held.  
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with the result that the wider public is often left misinformed by false 
publications.9 This situation arises on account of a number of systemic 
weaknesses. First, limitations on access to justice for claimants can mean that 
some errors are never challenged. Secondly, the award of damages alone for 
vindication does not necessarily highlight mistakes that have been published,10 and 
if apologies and corrections are made this is often done without what might be 
considered to be due prominence. Thirdly, the manner in which the Reynolds public 
interest defence currently operates masks the fact that the impugned publication 
has not been demonstrated to be true, and the claimant is left without vindication 
of reputation. Whether such continuing misinformation is in the public interest 
can be reasonably questioned.11 This need not be the impact of a coherent libel 
regime. In our view, libel law can be constructed so as to form part of the 
‘discursive constitution’. Perhaps paradoxically, it can be so designed as to 
promote freedom of expression, and to secure the provision to the general public 
of the fullest possible information on matters of collective importance. Mandated 
discursive remedies – such as corrections, apologies, and rights of reply – could 
serve these objectives. 
 
TAKING REPUTATION SERIOUSLY 
 
Some uncertainty surrounds the status of reputation in law. A notable 
development in Convention jurisprudence concerns the drawing of the concept 
within the ambit of Article 8 ECHR.12 Yet, reputation – by dint of being 
                                                     
9 The imperative of making such corrections is recognised in journalists’ own statements of professional 
ethics – see for example the PCC Editors’ Code of Practice, clause 1(ii) (‘a significant inaccuracy, misleading 
statement or distortion once recognised must be corrected, promptly and with due prominence, and − 
where appropriate − an apology published’); NUJ Code of Conduct, clause 3 (‘[a journalist] does her/his 
utmost to correct harmful inaccuracies’) – although it is a common complaint that such principles are 
much-honoured in the breach. Interestingly, as regards the ‘Comment is free’ section of its website, The 
Guardian provides an automatic right of reply to any person mentioned in a published article (see 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/series/response).  The failure to ensure the correction of 
misinformation can also be seen as a shortcoming of the American approach to the defamation of public 
figures. Traditionally, this concern has been addressed by a relatively high and generalised commitment to 
journalistic ethics that insists upon fact-checking and the correction of error. It may be, however, that the 
inadequacies of this ‘cultural’ form of regulation are exposed when confronted with more ‘populist’ forms 
of media content such as that reflected in publications such as the National Enquirer or broadcasters such 
as Fox. 
10 Although Clause 1(iv) of the PCC Editors’ Code of Practice provides that ‘a publication must report fairly 
and accurately the outcome of an action for defamation to which it has been a party’. Libel claims that are 
settled will often include an agreement that an appropriate correction and / or apology will be published, 
and sometimes that an apologetic statement in open court will be made. 
11 J. Coad, ‘Reynolds and Public Interest: What About Truth and Human Rights?’ (2007) 18(3) 
Entertainment Law Review 75. 
12 The first jurisprudential association between the protection of reputation and the right to private life 
was made only in 2004. In Radio France v France (2005) 40 EHRR 706, the court observed – in a passing 
reference only – that ‘the right to protection of one’s reputation is of course one of the rights guaranteed 
by Article 8 of the Convention’, at [31]. Shortly afterwards, in Chauvy v France (2005) 41 EHRR 29, the 
court proceeded on the basis that the inclusion of an individual’s reputation as a value actively protected 
under Article 8 was routine, at [70]. This shift was subsequently alluded to in a number of further cases – 
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determined by aggregating the appraisals made of an individual by other people – 
is quintessentially public in nature. The emerging case law therefore immediately 
begs the question of how reputation can be protected as an aspect of one’s private 
or family life.  
The first strands of this jurisprudence were roundly rejected by some notable 
commentators. Robertson and Nicol, for example, were categorical in their 
derision of what they considered to be an ‘impermissible slight [sic] of hand’.13 
They asserted that the recognition of reputation as a component of Article 8 was 
the ‘careless’ and ‘illegitimate’ result of ‘overworked judges and their registrars 
churning out decisions’.14 They viewed the equation between reputation and 
privacy as a ‘brazen’, ‘plainly wrong […] aberration’, and the fruit of European 
judges’ ‘unprincipled and unprecedented frolics’.15 Irrespective of this critique, the 
development has subsequently been confirmed in a number of Strasbourg 
decisions, and has also been endorsed in domestic jurisprudence. In the first of the 
European decisions, Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v France, an expanded 
justification for the inclusion of reputation as a component of Article 8 was 
developed in a concurring judgment.16 In Pfeifer v Austria, the Strasbourg court 
demonstrated incontrovertibly for the first time, and at some length, how the 
balancing of Articles 8 and 10 should proceed in defamation actions.17 Some 
subsequent decisions of the European Court, however, have been more 
equivocal.18 Notwithstanding this, the development was considered and affirmed 
by the Supreme Court in Re Guardian News & Media Ltd.19 
None of this case law particularly answers the normative question as to quite 
why a ‘right to reputation’ should be considered to fall within Article 8. There is a 
persuasive answer, however, and it is to be found in the social psychology canon.20 
                                                                                                                                       
see for example Cumpănă and Mazăre v Romania (2005) 41 EHRR 41 at [91]; White v Sweden (2008) 46 
EHRR 3 at [26]; Leempoel v Belgium, Application No 64772/01 (unreported, 9 November 2006) at [67]. 
For an excellent overview and discussion of this development, see H. Rogers, ‘Is There a Right to 
Reputation?’ (26 October 2010) Inforrm, part one, and (2010) (29 October) Inform, part two. 
13 G. Robertson and A. Nicol, Media Law (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 5th ed, 2007), 67. 
14 ibid. 
15 ibid, 70. 
16 (2008) 46 EHRR 35. 
17 (2009) 48 EHRR 8. 
18 See for example Karako v Hungary, app.no 39311/05 (ECtHR, unreported, 29 April 2009). 
19 [2010] UKSC 1 at [37]–[42], per Lord Rodger. See also, Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA 
Civ 1462 at [68]; Flood v Times Newspapers Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 804 at [20]; Thornton v Telegraph Media 
Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB) at [39]. 
20 See generally N. Emler, ‘A Social Psychology of Reputation’ in W. Stroebe and M. Hewstone (eds) 
(1990) 1 European Review of Social Psychology 171. Our adoption of this literature is unlikely to be considered 
exceptional by those who have considered the function and design of defamation law. Professor Eric 
Barendt’s rumination, in ‘What is the Point of Libel Law?’ (1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 110, made 
precisely this point, and has been the starting point for much recent reflection. Earlier still, the seminal 
article on reputation and defamation by Robert Post has also informed much subsequent research – see 
‘The Social Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution’ (1986) 74 California Law 
Review 691. Post considered that reputation could be understood in different ways, as property, as honour, 
and as dignity. In the last respect, he noted that a person’s dignity depends on whether others in the 
community give him the deference that is his desert as a full member of society. As he explained, ‘our 
own sense of intrinsic self-worth, stored in the deepest recesses of our “private personality” is perpetually 
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In social psychology, for over one hundred years, it has been absolutely standard, 
generally accepted knowledge that the opinions of others become incorporated 
into the individual’s sense of self-worth. In 1902, Charles Cooley developed the 
framework of the ‘looking-glass self’.21 In 1934, George Herbert Mead described a 
similar process, and observed that ‘we are more or less unconsciously seeing 
ourselves as others see us’.22 Subsequently, these formulations have been revised 
somewhat, and three components of self-worth have been identified: self-
appraisals, the actual appraisals made by others, and the individual’s perceptions of 
the appraisals made by others (or ‘reflected appraisals’). Interestingly, considerable 
research indicates that there is a stronger relationship between reflected appraisals 
and self-appraisal, than between actual appraisals and self-appraisals. 
Social psychology tells us that it is primarily the perceived level of esteem that 
we think others hold for us that affects our judgments of self-worth. Hence, it is 
not difficult to appreciate why libellous publications might undermine an 
individual’s sense of self-esteem; how defamatory statements can impact upon our 
capacity to engage in society. Over time, and drawing on the concepts of human 
dignity and autonomy, Strasbourg jurisprudence has expanded the coverage of 
Article 8 to encompass both a person’s physical and their psychological integrity.23 
In light of this, it is perfectly reasonable to contemplate a Convention right to 
reputation. It is also easy to understand why libel law should correct for harms to 
self-esteem caused by false statements. 
In terms of the level of compensation that might be necessary to address 
harms of this type, it is important to appreciate that the level of esteem in which 
we think others hold us is not the singular determinant of self-worth. Often, 
perhaps usually, the influence of reflected appraisals will be trifling relative to 
other factors. Hence, in standard cases the appropriate measure of damages might 
be expected to be quite low. On occasion, however, the psychological impact of 
perceived reputational harm may be devastating. Referring to the impact of 
publication of details and video footage of his private sexual behaviour, Max 
Mosley has commented that: 
 
                                                                                                                                       
dependent upon the ceremonial observance by those around us of rules of defence and demeanor, 
thereby protecting the dignity of its members’, 710. He considered that, denied such deference, a person’s 
intrinsic sense of his own self-worth and dignity is diminished. A similar idea was aired by the 
Marchoness de Lambert in Advice of A Mother to her Son: A Tract Particularly Recommended to His Son by Lord 
Chesterfield, ‘the love of esteem is the life and soul of society; it unites us to one another: I want your 
approbation, you stand in need of mine. By forsaking the converse of men, we forsake the virtues 
necessary for society; for when one is alone, one is apt to grow negligent; the world forces you to have a 
guard over yourself’. In Practical Morality, or, a Guide to Men and Manners (William Andrus, 1841), 155. 
21 C. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York: Scribner, 1902). 
22 G.H. Mead, Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1934), 68. 
23 See for example Von Hannover v Germany (2005) 40 EHRR 1 at [33]. In R (Gillan) v Commissioner of Police 
for the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12, Lord Bingham noted that ‘“private life” has been generously construed 
to embrace wide rights to personal autonomy’ at [28]. 
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[...] if somebody takes away your dignity, for want of a better word, you can 
never replace it. No matter how long I live, no matter what part of the world 
I go to, people will know about it [...] People do not [snigger behind your 
back and make jokes] but you know that they know [...] you go into any place, 
a restaurant or anything and nobody says anything but you know they all 
know. You know that in any country you go to, and I go all over the world, I 
know they all know and that is not very nice for me [...] the suffering 
[newspapers] impose not just on the victim but on his family is really, really 
serious.24 
 
In his judgment in the associated privacy action, Mr Justice Eady affirmed that ‘the 
claimant [...] is hardly exaggerating when he says that his life was ruined’.25  
Even more poignantly, in the case involving Christopher Lillie and Dawn 
Reed (two nursery school workers wrongly accused of systematically sexually 
abusing children in their care), Mr Justice Eady commented that: 
 
[...] with the possible exception of murder, it is difficult to think of any charge 
more calculated to lead to the revulsion and condemnation of a person’s 
fellow citizens than that of the systematic and sadistic abuse of children [...] 
[the defendants] must have appreciated too that the claimants’ lives would 
never be the same again. It would not have taken much imagination to 
visualise the virulence of the reactions they would stir up in the general 
public. The two claimants recalled in evidence how they had to leave in haste 
their homes, families and career prospects. They had to go into hiding.26 
 
Asked during cross-examination how she had felt in the months following 
publication of the allegations, Reed explained ‘low enough to think my family 
would have an easier life without me [...] I would sit at the top of Marsden cliffs in 
my car with the engine running’.27 For such very significant harms, the libel regime 
should provide access to very substantial compensatory damages. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
24 House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee (2009-2010), Second Report: Press Standards, 
Privacy and Libel. HC 362-II (London: The Stationery Office Limited), Ev 56. 
25 Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB) at [236]. 
26 Lillie and Reed v Newcastle City Council [2002] EWHC 1600 (QB) at [1538]-[1539]. 
27 B. Woffinden and R. Webster, ‘Cleared’ The Guardian (31 July 2002). A similar illustration can be seen 
in the admission by Professor Phil Jones of the University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit that he 
had contemplated suicide following allegations that he had manipulated research data concerning the 
impact of human behaviour on the global climate. Professor Jones was subsequently exonerated of 
wrongdoing – see A. Laing, ‘“Climategate” Professor Phil Jones “Considered Suicide Over Email 
Scandal”’ Daily Telegraph (7 February 2010). 
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TAKING ACCESS TO JUSTICE SERIOUSLY 
 
Access to justice is important in terms of both principle and practice. In terms of 
principle, there is a clear association between such access and the rule of law.28 It 
is not impossible to imagine a disgruntled claimant, too poor to go to the law, 
somehow taking the law into their own hands. This may seem fanciful, but its 
plausibility has been thoroughly demonstrated in Heinrich Böll’s classic novel The 
Lost Honour of Katharina Blum. It is also possible to understand the curiously one-
sided representation of the problems of libel law in the national press as a specific 
response to the frustration of some defendants in the face of what they perceive as 
obvious, but intractable, injustice. 
On the practical side, the chilling effect of the very high potential liability in 
costs for defendants under the current libel regime has rightly been a primary 
focus of the libel reform debate. Estimates vary, but it is not uncommon for it to 
be suggested that contested actions will likely result in costs bills that run into the 
millions of pounds.29 As a matter of logic, the upshot is likely to be that there will 
be financial incentives to settle cases irrespective of the merits of the claim. For 
even well-heeled defendants, the potential cost of defending a libel action may 
sometimes be prohibitive. 
The main factors that are said to contribute to the cost of proceedings are the 
protracted nature of libel proceedings and the high base costs charged by specialist 
libel lawyers. In addition, where utilised, conditional fee agreements (CFAs) 
currently permit the charging of an uplift on costs (the ‘success fee’) of up to 100 
per cent (although in practice this uplift would rarely exceed a figure of half that 
and figures produced by claimant law firms, to which we have had access, suggest 
that the average uplift is around 20 per cent). Moreover, ‘after-the-event’  (ATE) 
insurance premiums that protect the users of CFAs against the risk of incurring 
the costs burden associated with losing the case can also be charged to the losing 
party. 
While the practical difficulty for libel defendants in securing access to justice 
is much discussed, the converse problems facing claimants are rarely highlighted. 
                                                     
28 See for example Lord Neuberger, ‘Has Mediation Had Its Day?’ (First Gordon Slynn Memorial 
Lecture, 2010): ‘the law’s majestic equality is for civil justice of fundamental importance. Notwithstanding 
the views of Anatole France to the contrary, equal access to justice for all underpins our commitment to 
the rule of law. It ensures that we live not under what Friedrich Meinecke characterised as a “government of 
will [but under] a government of law.” It ensures that any one individual citizen can come before the courts 
and stand before the seat of justice as an equal to his or her opponent − whether that opponent is 
another such individual, a powerful corporation or the state itself. We should not, in light of this, be too 
surprised to note that equality before the law, isonomia, – of which equal access to the courts is one 
aspect – was for the citizens of Athens two and a half thousand years ago, the basis out of which 
democracy arose’. 
29 An oft-cited statistic is that costs of proceedings here are four times as high as the next most expensive 
European state (Ireland), and 140 times the average cost in other European jurisdictions – see PCMLP, 
Comparative Study of Costs of Defamation Proceedings Across Europe (2008), at http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/ 
(last visited October 2010). The sustainability of this research finding has, however, been refuted – see D. 
Howarth, ‘The Cost of Libel Actions: A Sceptical Note’ (2011) 70 Cambridge Law Journal (forthcoming). 
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The cost of libel actions is prohibitive for many prospective claimants. Indeed, the 
one-time ‘rule of thumb’ regarding assessment of the legal risk of publication 
rested upon the claimant’s means. This calculus has been altered somewhat by the 
availability of CFAs. That said, CFAs and hence the courts more generally are not 
available to all prospective claimants, but rather only to those who satisfy the risk 
management regimes operated by claimant lawyers. Proposals, such as that floated 
by the last Government,30 or that put forward by Lord Justice Jackson,31 to amend 
the current regime by drastically reducing the available success fees risk 
exacerbating these concerns. Having conducted a review of the available evidence 
on the cost of libel proceedings, one commentator concluded that ‘the reality is 
that we know little about the costs of libel cases, and what we do know does not 
justify precipitate measures that would have the effect of reducing claimants’ 
access to justice’.32 
 
 
 
APPLICATION: THE PURPOSES OF LIBEL LAW 
 
In determining the purposes of libel law, a reasonable starting point is to note 
what are the stated objectives of various remedies currently afforded to successful 
claimants. In English law, damages are the standard remedy, and four objectives 
underpinning their award can be discerned: to compensate for distress, hurt and 
humiliation; to compensate for unquantifiable, presumed reputational harm; to 
compensate for special (provable) harm, and to vindicate or restore the claimant’s 
damaged reputation.33 In the paragraphs that follow we note how these objectives 
might best be understood in light of the foregoing discussion, and highlight the 
ramifications of our analysis for the design of a coherent libel regime. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
30 The abortive Conditional Fee Agreements (Amendment) Order 2010 proposed under section 58(4) of 
the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 was criticised by the House of Lords Merits Committee (HL 94), 
the House of Commons First Delegated Legislation Committee (30 March 2010), and in debate on the 
floor of the House of Lords (718 HLDeb cols 1152-1178) before being lost in the ‘wash-up’ before the 
prorogation of Parliament prior to the 2010 general election. In evidence to the Lords committee, law 
firm Carter Ruck noted ‘widespread concern within the legal profession that the proposed reduction in 
success fees would seriously reduce − if not eliminate altogether − the rights of ordinary individuals 
without substantial means to obtain access to justice in defamation and privacy cases’. Professor Richard 
Moorhead of Cardiff University concurred: ‘the basic economics of conditional fee agreements would 
suggest that [...] a level of 10% uplift would prevent all but the most meritorious cases from proceeding 
on a conditional fee. For rich litigants, this presents no problem, for poorer litigants this presents a major 
impediment to access to justice’.  
31 Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs (London: Ministry of Justice, 2010), ch 32. 
32 Howarth, n 30 above. 
33 John v MGN Ltd [1997] QB 586, at [607] (per Sir Thomas Bingham MR). 
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COMPENSATING ARTICLE 8 HARM 
 
As regards the objective of compensating for the distress and injury to feelings 
caused by libel, it would seem reasonable to assert that the harm that requires 
compensation in this regard is that identified in the foregoing discussion of social 
psychology. It is to the extent of such harm that we consider the protection of 
reputation to fall within the ambit of Article 8 ECHR.34 As noted above, we 
consider that in the majority of cases the quantum of damages that would be 
necessary to compensate for the harm suffered by a claimant would be relatively 
low. In that context, it is reasonable to consider a damages ‘cap’. A figure of £10k 
has been mooted by some.35 We take the view that a ‘hard’ cap on libel damages 
would be inappropriate (but see further below). Beyond this, however, 
understanding this head of damages in line with the above discussion entails a 
number of ramifications for the design of the libel regime. 
 
Ramifications: Meaning 
Disputes about meaning are often central to libel actions, with the result that 
much lawyers’ time and hence significant legal costs are spent on the matter. This 
situation arises in part because the law requires a ‘single meaning’ to be inferred 
from the impugned publication, and the determination of this single meaning is 
usually left to the jury at the end of the trial. Thus, argument must sometimes be 
presented to the court – by both parties to the action – relating to meanings that 
are ultimately deemed irrelevant. If one understands this element of the harm in 
question as having been caused in the mind of the claimant, then it is the 
claimant's inferred meaning that should provide the basis for the subsequent 
consideration, subject to a test of reasonableness or significance. The 
reasonableness threshold would introduce a necessary element of objectivity into 
the exercise. Such a test would speak to the need for a sufficient level of 
seriousness as is required to engage Article 8 ECHR.36 Hence, the determination 
                                                     
34 Actual harms to reputation speak more to the conception of reputation as property discussed by Post – 
see n 21 above. 
35 In a parliamentary debate, Denis MacShane MP suggested a cap of £10k – 485 HCDeb cols 74WH, 17 
December 2008. Moreover, the Index / PEN report also suggested a cap of £10k, but with room for 
additional sums where special damage can be proven (the report also emphasised the preferability of 
some form of apology remedy) – see n 2 above. We have previously stated, however, that ‘this level of 
damages cap is seriously flawed’ on the basis – inter alia – that such an award would simply be insufficient 
to compensate someone in the position of the McCanns or Lillie and Reed (nursery workers accused of 
child sexual abuse in a public authority report) – see Mullis and Scott, ‘Something Rotten in the State of 
English Libel Law?’, n 3 above, 177-178. We note also that in a recent public lecture, Lord Hoffmann 
contrasted the proposed cap with the exorbitant sums that newspapers regularly pay sources for salacious 
stories – see ‘Lord Hoffmann and Libel Tourism: Three Comments’ (2010) (5 March) Inforrm. No 
proposal to cap damages was included in the Lester Bill. 
36 In Wood v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2009] EWCA Civ 414, Laws LJ commented that the 
‘core right protected by Article 8, however protean, should not be read so widely that its claims become 
unreal and unreasonable [...] the alleged threat or assault to the individual's personal autonomy must (if 
Article 8 is to be engaged) attain “a certain level of seriousness”’ at [22]-[23]. See also R (Gillan) v 
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of meaning becomes very straightforward. The question is not ‘what is the 
meaning’, but rather only ‘is the given meaning a capable or reasonable one’. 
The ramifications of this approach are very significant. There would be no 
reason to leave the determination of meaning to a jury. Hence, there would be no 
reason to persist with the ‘single meaning rule’, a legal fiction − it is obvious that 
in fact words are understood in different ways by different people − that has been 
described as ‘anomalous, frequently otiose and, where not otiose, unjust’.37 There 
would be no need to argue defences relevant to multiple, indeterminate meanings. 
The claimant would have an incentive to plead mainstream or natural meanings so 
as to satisfy the reasonableness test. 
 
Ramifications: Defences 
The primary defences that would be necessary in the context of the revised 
approach to compensation for Article 8 harm would be those focused on 
meaning: justification (truth) and fair comment (honest opinion). There would be 
no particular need to retain the Reynolds privilege, unless the possible quantum of 
damages is very significant. That defence was introduced to offset the chilling 
effect of the high costs and potential liability in damages of libel actions. Given the 
approach to meaning outlined above, the complexity and hence cost of the 
majority of such actions should be very significantly reduced. It would be faintly 
comic – and obviously tautological − for defendants to claim that costs remain a 
significant problem necessitating the retention of a public interest defence to limit 
the chilling effect of libel, if the primary generator of costs was precisely the 
defendant’s own choice to rely on that public interest defence. Hence, if damages 
too are limited, then the logic for the defence dissolves. This is especially the case 
when one considers that there have always been concerns regarding the 
pathological consequences of the defence. One complaint regarding Reynolds − and 
the US comparator approach in New York Times v Sullivan − is that it displaces all 
focus away from the truth or otherwise of the allegations made onto the question 
of whether journalistic practices have been responsible.38 Moreover, claimants do 
not receive vindication, and inaccuracies that misinform the wider public are not 
corrected. This argument suggests that a two-track libel regime, with different 
routes for standard and more serious cases, may be appropriate. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2006] UKHL 12 at [28] (per Lord Bingham); Secretary of State for Work 
and Pensions v M [2006] UKHL 11 at [83] (per Lord Walker). 
37 Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe SAS v ASDA Stores Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 609 at [31] (per Sedley LJ). Lord 
Justice Rimer added that ‘if the single meaning rule does achieve a fair balance in defamation law between 
the parties’ competing interests, that would appear to be the result of luck rather than judgment [...] the 
application of the rule can also be said to carry with it the potential for swinging the balance unfairly 
against one party of the other, resulting in no compensation in cases when fairness might suggest that 
some should be due, or in over-compensation in others’ at [43]. 
38 See for example the contribution of Professor Roy Greensalde to the ‘Reframing Libel’ symposium, n 9 
above. 
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Ramifications: Standing 
One significant debate regarding libel reform concerns the question of whether 
corporations should continue to be permitted to sue in libel, and if so whether 
they should be subjected to especial requirements such as an obligation to prove 
damage.39 The current position with regard to damages is that corporations cannot 
sue in respect of injury to feelings,40 but they can recover substantial damages even 
in the absence of proof of special damage for words that have a tendency to injure 
them in the way of their business.41 Under the revised understanding of injury to 
feelings described above, there would remain no basis for corporations to recover 
for Article 8 harm. 
 
Ramifications: Costs and access to justice 
The changes outlined above on the determination of meaning and on defences 
would entail that there would be a very substantial reduction in costs in respect of 
Article 8 harm. The upshot would be that there would be enhanced access to 
justice for relatively impecunious claimants who are not currently able to avail of a 
CFA, while the chilling effect on publication would be significantly reduced. 
 
VINDICATING REPUTATION AND COMPENSATING FOR INTANGIBLE HARM 
 
In addition to compensating the claimant for hurt feelings, damages are also 
currently awarded both to compensate for unquantifiable, presumed reputational 
harm and to vindicate / restore the claimant’s reputation. These heads of damage 
are available in order that the harm that is caused to the claimant’s reputation in 
the minds of third parties is corrected and compensated. We are not persuaded 
that in either respect the current form of remedy allowed is the most efficacious or 
appropriate available. 
 
Discursive remedies for vindication 
The award of damages to vindicate the claimant’s reputation was justified by Lord 
Hailsham in Cassell v Broome as necessary ‘in case the libel, driven underground, 
emerges from its lurking place at some future date [...] [to allow the claimant] to 
point to a sum awarded by a jury sufficient to convince a bystander of the 
baselessness of the charge’.42 Of course, money can be used to serve such a 
function, but we are not persuaded that it represents the best means of achieving 
vindication. In other jurisdictions, this function is fulfilled by the provision of a 
discursive remedy. As Hugh Tomlinson QC has pointed out, ‘in many European 
                                                     
39 The Index / PEN report recommended that corporations should be denied standing to sue in libel, 
and be required instead to rely upon malicious falsehood – see n 2 above. Clause 11 of the Lester Bill 
provides that corporations should have to prove ‘substantial financial loss’. 
40 Lewis v Daily Telegraph [1964] AC 234 at [262] (per Lord Reid). 
41 Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe SPRL [2006] UKHL 44. 
42 [1972] AC 1027 at [1071]. 
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countries the primary remedy is an order for the publication of corrections or 
apology – often in the form of the publication of a summary of the Court’s 
judgment. This would provide vindication without the need for substantial 
damages’.43 An alternative would be a mandated declaration of falsity or a right of 
reply published with due prominence. Such a remedy has been said to be 
unavailable at common law,44 though it does exist under section 9 of the 
Defamation Act 1996 on the summary disposal of a claim under section 8 of the 
Act.45 
In our view, the most effective way of vindicating a person’s reputation is to 
introduce a new remedy requiring provision of an appropriate discursive remedy. 
In this respect we agree, in part, with the view expressed in the Index / Pen report 
that ‘the chief remedy in libel should be an apology, not financial reward’.46 The 
grant of a discursive remedy would remove the need to award damages to 
vindicate the claimant’s reputation, but would instead provide the claimant with 
the very thing that most claimants want: a public declaration that they did not do 
what they were alleged to have done. The chilling effect of a potentially large 
damages award would be reduced, and importantly − if we are serious about 
achieving one of the underlying purposes of freedom of expression − the truth 
would enter the public sphere and be made available to the public. As the PCC 
Editors’ Code of Practice states, ‘a significant inaccuracy, misleading statement or 
distortion once recognised must be corrected, promptly and with due prominence, 
and − where appropriate − an apology published’.47 Therefore, we propose the 
withdrawal of damages for vindication.  
 
Withdrawal of the remedy in damages for intangible harm 
In addition to the withdrawal of damages for vindication, we suggest that no 
award should be made for unquantifiable, presumed harm to reputation. In some 
respects, this may appear to conflict with our earlier comments regarding the 
social impact that a defamatory statement can have on a person. We do not 
underestimate the harm that such a statement can cause to a person’s standing in 
his community, and indeed social psychological research is beginning to evidence 
the fact that in many cases reputational damage is likely to linger even after the 
truth is published. Discursive remedies designed to restore reputation will 
sometimes not be perfect in effect; they may not entirely eradicate the ‘stain’ on 
the claimant’s reputation. In the face of such arguments, our reasons for 
                                                     
43 ‘Libel, Damages and Declarations of Falsity’ (2010) (2 November) Inforrm. 
44 Loutchansky v Times Newspapers (No.6) [2002] EMLR 44. 
45 Pursuant to Defamation Act 1996, s 9(1), the claimant may obtain such of the following as may be 
appropriate: 
(a) a declaration that the statement of which he complains was false and defamatory;  
(b) an order that the defendant publish or cause to be published a suitable correction and apology; 
(c) damages not exceeding £10,000; and 
(d) an order restraining the defendant from publishing or further publishing the matter complained of. 
46 Index /Pen Report, n 2 above, 8. 
47 cl 1(ii). 
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recommending that damages for unquantifiable, presumed harm to reputation be 
withdrawn are largely pragmatic. We take the view that the award of damages 
under Article 8 ECHR for the pain and humiliation caused by the publication 
together with an appropriate discursive remedy for vindication will provide an 
adequate – although admittedly not perfect − remedy for the harm caused. The 
proposed remedies would give most claimants what they want. They avoid the 
indeterminacy surrounding the task of fixing on an appropriate sum, and they 
reflect the underlying importance of freedom of expression. 
 
Ramifications: Determination of meaning for purposes of the discursive remedy 
If a new discursive remedy is introduced and damages for vindication and 
presumed reputational harm are withdrawn, a question arises as to whether it is 
still appropriate to use the meaning pleaded by the claimant and determined by the 
judge to be a reasonable one. In other words, if the judge orders the defendant to 
apologise, in respect of what meaning should the libel be assessed and any apology 
made? In our view, the continued use of the claimant’s meaning(s) remains entirely 
appropriate. Put another way, all defamatory meanings pleaded by the claimant 
should, if deemed reasonable by the judge or tribunal, be met with a discursive 
remedy. Where it is determined that the meaning(s) pleaded by the claimant is in 
fact a reasonable one, then in effect this entails that some reasonable readers 
would in all probability have read the words in the way set out. Given this, where 
no defence is made out it seems entirely appropriate to require the defendant 
either to apologise for publishing the complained of statement and / or to explain 
that the impugned meaning was unintended. In either event, the current single 
meaning rule could be safely abandoned here as in the claim for malicious 
falsehood.48 
 
Ramifications: Corporations, standing, and appropriate remedies 
As is implicit in the foregoing, we take the view that − in the absence of proof of 
special damage − corporations should be entitled only to a discursive remedy, and 
they should be unable to recover damages for unquantifiable, presumed 
reputational harm. We have previously noted the importance of the corporate 
sector to the British economy,49 and we view with concern the approach taken in 
the Lester Bill that would only allow a company to sue if it can prove that the 
publication of the words or matters complained of has caused or is likely to cause 
‘substantial financial loss’.50 We also recognise the real danger, however, that large 
and powerful companies may, through the threat of a libel claim, chill legitimate 
and accurate comment about their conduct. Rather than isolating corporations and 
specifically limiting their right to sue in any respect, our proposals address 
                                                     
48 Ajinomoto Sweeteners Europe SAS v ASDA Stores Ltd [2010] EWCA Civ 609. 
49 Mullis and Scott (2009), n 3 above. 
50 Defamation Bill 2010, cl 11. 
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incidentally the potential misuse of libel by all relatively powerful entities to 
achieve strategic goals unrelated to the substantive merit of claims. 
 
Ramifications: Defences 
So far as the defences are concerned, under our approach the defendant would be 
free to rely on the defences of justification (truth) and fair comment (honest 
opinion). We see no reason to make significant changes to these defences as they 
currently exist in English law. Insofar as justification is concerned, the defence 
would succeed only if the defendant could prove the words true in the meaning(s) 
pleaded by the claimant and accepted by the judge as a reasonable meaning. 
As regards Reynolds privilege, we would draw a distinction between standard 
cases and those involving more serious and / or damaging statements. Where only 
a discursive remedy and (possibly) a minimal measure of damages for Article 8 
harm are sought, the pre-publication umbrella afforded by Reynolds against the 
potential chilling effect of the threat of a libel claim is unnecessary. The chilling 
effect will have been significantly addressed by simplifying the existing procedure, 
reducing costs, and limiting the remedies available. To allow a defendant to rely on 
Reynolds in this situation would unduly weight the balance in favour of the 
defendant and would unnecessarily increase the costs in such cases. 
Again, however, there is an argument for a bifurcated approach dependent 
upon the severity of Article 8 harm and / or the capacity to plead special damage. 
In the latter type of case, there is very much more at stake. The potential costs of 
defending a full-blown libel claim where the allegation made is of a particularly 
serious nature or has particularly serious repercussions, in addition to the extent of 
the damages that may be awarded, inevitably means that the chilling effect would 
be considerably increased. In these circumstances, it seems appropriate to allow 
the defendant to avail itself of Reynolds if sued. The knowledge that such a defence 
is available would limit the potential pre-publication chilling effect. If at trial the 
defendant sought but failed to rely on justification or simply relied solely on 
Reynolds by way of defence, however, the claimant should be entitled to a 
declaration of falsity or a right of reply. This would properly value both the Article 
10 and Article 8 rights at stake. 
 
Reflections 
Clearly there are ‘down-sides’ for both parties in our proposals. So far as the 
defendant is concerned, it could be forced to provide a proper and prominent 
apology or have a declaration of falsity issued against it which would be placed on 
the record and could be relied upon by the claimant to vindicate reputation. Yet 
the media, and newspapers in particular, have traditionally been very hostile to the 
imposition of a mandated apology or declaration of falsity. As the eminent 
claimant lawyer Keith Schilling has noted, ‘newspapers want to pay negligible 
damages and print a small apology buried away in the middle of the paper – this of 
  
Alastair Mullis and Andrew Scott                                         Reframing Libel 
  
 
 17 
course achieves nothing except to annoy the person injured’.51 Mandating a 
discursive remedy would certainly involve interference with the defendant’s Article 
10 right ‘not to speak’. We consider, however, that this would not be 
disproportionate, especially in light of the countervailing interest of the wider 
public in being fully and accurately informed on matters of public concern. An 
obligation to dedicate space to discursive remedies would be commercially 
disadvantageous: no organisation which relies for its revenue on a reputation for 
accuracy, probity, and credibility wants to apologise publically for getting facts 
wrong. The upside for media defendants would be that the public and swift 
acceptance of error would have the useful, and entirely desirable, impact of 
enhancing journalistic credibility. 
Perhaps most importantly, the award of a discursive remedy offers substantial 
benefits for society as a whole. Where granted, they would have the important 
effect that the public is not left misinformed by inaccurate but uncorrected 
statements on matters of public importance. Today, where Reynolds is successfully 
relied upon, in the absence of a voluntary publication of a correction by the 
defendant, the potential exists for an untrue statement to remain on the public 
record. Moreover, even where a plea of justification fails, and the claimant is 
awarded damages, the mere existence of a reasoned judgment in favour of the 
claimant only doubtfully has the symbolic power of a straightforward and short 
statement of correction or an apology. The award of a discursive remedy would 
avoid these unsatisfactory results, and properly validate the claimant’s Article 8 
rights while ensuring that the public as a whole was aware of the errors in the 
original publication. 
So far as the claimant is concerned, it must be recognised that the award of 
damages only for the pain and humiliation caused by the defamatory statement 
together with a discursive remedy may not wholly compensate the claimant for the 
injury he has suffered. Even after the publication of an apology and payment of a 
sum of damages, the fact is that in many cases reputational damage is likely to 
linger even after the truth is published. We take the view, however, that our 
approach strikes an appropriate balance between the claimant’s Article 8 rights and 
the defendant’s Article 10 rights, while also countenancing wider social goods. 
Pragmatically, some compromise of this nature seems essential to break the 
deadlock – both in principle and in public debate − over the design of a coherent 
libel regime.  
 
COMPENSATION FOR PROVABLE HARM 
 
While damages should not be available to vindicate / restore the claimant’s 
reputation or for any unquantifiable presumed reputational harm, we take the view 
that the claimant should be able to recover in respect of any special damages that 
                                                     
51 W. Cash, ‘Stop the Presses’ (2010) (Summer) Spears 28, 30. 
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he can establish. No good reason exists to prevent the recoverability of such 
damages, and the danger that a substantial claim for special damages may have a 
unduly chilling effect is mitigated in part by the recognised difficulty of proving 
such loss.52 Abusive threats to litigate could be relatively easily dismissed on the 
basis of the power of the court to strike out any claim for special damages where it 
has no reasonable possibility of success.53  
Where a claim for special damages is made, all of the defences currently 
available to the defendant could be relied upon. It would be for the court to 
determine whether the defamatory statement caused the damage complained of. 
Here again, meaning becomes less central to proceedings as the primary focus is 
placed on the reasonable foreseeability of the special damage in question, which in 
turn implies that it must be possible for particular meanings to have been 
reasonably inferred. 
 
 
 
ENDPOINT: A TWO-TRACK LIBEL REGIME 
 
Drawing the strands of the foregoing analysis together, it becomes possible to 
recommend a coherent set of significant substantive and procedural reforms that 
if enacted would enhance access to justice, simplify processes, and reduce costs for 
the vast majority of libel actions. In essence, our proposal involves the 
recommendation of a two-track libel regime. 
 
TRACK ONE: SIMPLIFIED TREATMENT FOR THE MAJORITY OF CLAIMS  
 
The first track in this new regime would comprise a much-simplified process. This 
could be administered by the High Court, but the function might instead be 
allocated to the County Court, the Tribunals Service, or an appropriately designed 
(self-)regulator. The overwhelming majority of cases would be addressed by this 
route. Damages would only be available for psychological harms protected under 
Article 8 ECHR, but would be capped at £10,000. Vindication would be obtained 
by an appropriate – and mandated − discursive remedy (correction, apology, right 
of reply, declaration of falsity). The remedy in damages for intangible harm to 
reputation would be withdrawn. Special damages for provable loss would be 
unavailable in this track. Determination of the meaning of imputations would be 
                                                     
52 Special damage must actually have accrued before the claim was brought. Neither the apprehension nor 
the possibility of such damage is sufficient to give rise to a claim. By way of example, in Michael v Spiers 
and Pond Ltd (1909) 101 LT 352, it was held that a threat by the father of the claimant to remove him 
from his office as director of a limited company unless he could succeed in vindicating his character 
against the charge of drunkenness was not actionable because he had suffered no temporal loss; the 
claimant still had his office, and the mere apprehension of its loss was insufficient to amount to special 
damage. 
53 CPR 3.4(2). 
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much simplified by adopting the meaning(s) inferred by the claimant subject to a 
test of reasonableness or significance. Truth and fair comment would remain as 
the primary defences, while in appropriate cases the defendant would also be able 
to rely on absolute, traditional, or statutory qualified privilege. The rationale 
underpinning the Reynolds public interest defence in track one would disappear. 
The approaches to substantive questions suggested here would very significantly 
reduce the complexity and cost associated with particular cases. Hence, it would 
reduce the chilling effect of the law on publication, and markedly enhance access 
to justice for defendants and claimants. 
 
TRACK TWO: FULL TRIAL FOR THE MOST SERIOUS AND / OR DAMAGING LIBELS 
 
The second track would be limited to the most serious and/or most damaging 
libels. Cases would proceed down this track only where special damages for 
provable loss are claimed, or where psychological harms protected under Article 8 
are severe so that the track one procedure would be manifestly inappropriate to 
deal with the case. Track two cases would continue to be heard in the High Court. 
As in track one, the remedy in damages for intangible harm to reputation would 
be unavailable, and vindication would be obtained by a discursive remedy. Where 
proven by the claimant, special damages would be recoverable. Uncapped damages 
would be available for Article 8 psychological harm (although a de facto cap would 
remain by pegging to damages recoverable for physical injury). On account of the 
power of the court to award very substantial damages and the likelihood of 
significantly increased costs, the potential pre-publication chilling effect requires 
the availability of a Reynolds-style public interest defence in track two. Where the 
defendant relies on Reynolds, however, proper recognition of the underlying 
principles of freedom of expression and the importance of reputation require that 
the defendant provide either a right of reply or a notice of correction with due 
prominence. Truth and / or fair comment would remain available, and in 
appropriate cases the defendant would be able to rely on absolute, traditional and 
/ or statutory qualified privilege. 
 
REFLECTIONS AND POSSIBLE CONCERNS 
 
We envisage that adoption of the above scheme would also provide significant 
incentives for complaints to be settled quickly between the parties without 
recourse to the formal legal regime. We recognise that the availability of track two 
may continue to facilitate the abusive threat of legal action, but suggest that claims 
to have suffered severe Article 8 harm or particular losses could be easily identified 
and quickly dismissed by the court if unsubstantiated. We also recognise that the 
releasing of media defendants in most cases from the risk of very significant legal 
costs and damages may encourage ‘game-playing’ by some organisations. In our 
view, the blunt constraint currently afforded by high costs is adequately 
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substituted by obliged dedication of space to accommodate discursive remedies 
and the loss of credibility that would go along with such repeated emphasis on 
poor quality journalism. We do not shy from the fact that these remedies 
themselves involve interference with defendants’ Article 10 rights ‘not to speak’. 
We also note that discursive remedies afforded quickly are often the primary 
outcome that claimants seek. 
